In the wake of Typhoon Morakot, approval ratings for the president and soon to be KMT chairman plunged to 20 percent from 47 percent in July while satisfaction with Premier Liu Chao-shiuan nosedived to 11 percent in a poll of 888 Taiwan adults conducted by the KMT-friendly TVBS last week.

Even more striking, the Global Views Survey Research Center's monthly Taiwan Public Mood Index for August showed that public confidence in Ma stood at 42.0 points on its 100 point scale, a sign of losing public confidence, while confidence in Liu had plummeted to 35.5 points and trust in the KMT dipped to 39.9 points.

On the other hand, public confidence in DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen rose to 45.1 points, topping Ma for the first time since last October, while public trust in the DPP, long shattered by the controversies over the corruption cases involving former president Chen Shui-bian and his family, has revived to 39.5 points, on a par with the ruling party.

While the bulk of the shift is undoubtedly due to soaring dissatisfaction with the KMT, the steady revival of public confidence in Tsai and her party reflects both affirmation of their rapid, effective and low-profile disaster relief work, especially in the DPP-administered counties in southern Taiwan most severely hurt by Typhoon Morakot.

Moreover, this result hints at growing public realization through the comparison with the KMT's performance of the relative superiority in overall governance of the former DPP government as well as its local mayors.

Moreover, Morakot, and the growing concerns over the Ma government's capability to cope with the threat of A(H1N1) swine influenza, is that a wrong decision in choosing national or local political leadership can literally be a life or death matter.

In the case of Typhoon Morakot, the formal structure and standard procedures for disaster rescue and relief by the central government are clearly stipulated in the National Disaster Prevention and Protection Law and actualized in the shape of the Central Emergency Operations Center developed mainly during the former DPP government and utilized in fairly effective disaster responses to several severe typhoons.

The formal framework and resources available for command by the CEOC remained the same as during several cases of fairly effective disaster response to severe typhoons by the former DPP government still exist.

The problem lies in the different leaders at the top of this structure and their poor quality informal decision-making, especially in terms of ingrained bureaucratic habits and outdated notions, such as Ma's statement that "local governments are responsible for disaster response and the central government provides assistance," that flatly contradicted the modern and proactive logic of the new institutional disaster response system.

Life and death matters

In a crisis, the public is far more concerned with the effectiveness of crisis response and management instead of the formal or "constitutional" logic of government policy and on this issue both Ma and the KMT government have been found to be seriously deficient.

Hence, even after Typhoon Morakot disappears in the limelight of the media and cross-strait relations returns as the "hot" issues, the public will continue to question the capacity of the Ma government in managing possible crises that may derive from his China-centric policies.

Moreover, the Morakot's explosion of the myth of the KMT's superior competence in governance over the DPP may result in a paradigmatic shift as it offers a new start for Taiwan voters and a reorientation of political and social priorities, especially since governance and crisis management are much more realistic and tangible yardsticks than abstract policies or ideological stands.

Tsai and the DPP can only take advantage of this opportunity if they are able to provide convincing evidence to the public that they can govern and not simply criticize better than the KMT.

Tsai's appointment of two commissions composed of reputable former DPP ministers experienced in disaster response and post-disaster reconstruction and in combatting the threats of SARS and avian influenza will show the DPP's quality as an "opposition party with governing experience" and will offer our society constructive criticism and monitoring of Ma government policies.

However, Tsai and her party need to be bolder and form the equivalent of a "shadow cabinet" that can offer positive criticism and monitoring of government policy in all key policy fields.

If the DPP is to have any hopes of winning the 2012 legislative and presidential polls and returning Taiwan-centric government to Taiwan, it must convince the Taiwan people that it is capable of governing Taiwan in the people's interest and governing Taiwan well.