Australia's adjustment of its strategic presence is taking place concurrently with similar readjustments by other powers, including the United States, Japan and South Korea and is undoubtedly related to the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a regional and global powerhouse.

Although Canberra has strong traditional ties with Washington, Australia's conservative government is exercising great care in dealing with the PRC and is taking pains to avoid being seen as part of a "containment" campaign against a "rising China."

In other words, Prime Minister John Howard's ruling conservative Liberal Party-National Party coalition's definition of Australia's national interests sees the axis of Australia's main security concerns as rooted in the relationship between Australia and the U.S., but has no intention of assuming the role of Washington's "deputy sheriff."

The interests of the two long-term allies may be consonant and complementary but not identical, but it is still worth noting that the relationship between Washington and Canberra has now expanded into a global partnership that encompasses the transnational security issues of terrorism, proliferation, resurrection of failed states as well as the complex traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific.

Strategic map

Based upon this background, maintaining closer security and political dialogues with Japan is also in Australia's interests. With this strategic map, any other elements of security interests can be incorporated, including the PRC and Taiwan and the uncertain state of cross-strait relations.

From this angle, it is clear that although Taiwan cannot have unrealistic expectations from Australia, there does exist many options for Taiwan to engage Australia since Taiwan also enjoys a similar axis of national security with Australia, namely the triangular Taiwan-U.S.-Japan relationship.

In this context, Taiwan can more actively explore its common interests with Australia as well as the U.S. and Japan.

For example, Australia is an advanced country in terms of its standards and quality of life, democratic system and protection for human rights and is also culturally and ethnically diverse and thus has a high degree of commonality of values with Taiwan's rising democracy.

Australia, as well Japan, is very active in the presence of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific Islands. Taiwan has also been a major investor in Southeast Asia and an important finance donor in the South Pacific Islands.

Hence, bilaterally or trilaterally, there exists some room for Taiwan and Australia as well as Japan to cooperate with each other so long as suitable attention to political sensitivities, such as Australia's advocacy of a pro-Beijing "one-China" policy, is given.

There should be especially room for cooperation in the field of nongovernmental organizations or public diplomacy.

Common concerns

Since democratization lifted restrictions imposed during the authoritarian Kuomintang regime on civil society, Taiwan's NGOs have blossomed and are very active and energetic internationally as well as domestically.

In terms of formal diplomacy, Canberra and Taipei both share common concerns in fields such as regional financial stability, anti-terrorism, disease prevention, natural disaster rescue and relief and other fields.

As for Australia's economically engaging China, Taiwan's vibrant companies, with their strong manufacturing and research and development capabilities and marketing channels, can also play a very important intermediary and "value adding" role between Australia and China.

In the past few years, the PRC has emerged as Australia's second largest merchandise trade partner at US$37.4 billion in 2005, including US$16.03 billion in exports, powered mainly by soaring exports of mineral products, and US$21.3 billion in merchandise imports, led by clothing and garments and computers, for a trade deficit of US$5.3 billion.

Security network

However, Taiwan is also an important trading partner for Australia, ranking ninth with two-way trade of $9.1 billion Australian dollars in 2005, including exports of $5.5 billion Australian dollars, up 25 percent from 2004, mainly coal, iron ore and other minerals and crude oil. Imports from Taiwan amounted to $3.6 billion Australian dollars, up one percent, consisting of mostly computers, refined petroleum products and telecommunications goods. As a result, Australia enjoyed a $1.9 billion Australian dollar trade surplus with Taiwan.

While the Howard government has been virtually obsessed with China's rising market, his government may be overlooking higher quality opportunities in Taiwan and neglecting the potential weight of the fact that Australia consistently enjoys a sizable trade surplus with Taiwan in contrast to its yawning trade deficit with the PRC.

This trade imbalance is one advantage that Taiwan enjoys and should make more efforts to develop, perhaps through stronger efforts to promote investment by Taiwan companies in Australia in both resources and manufacturing to take advantage of the sophisticated tastes and high purchasing clout of Australia's relatively small population.

From a tactical point of view, more and more social and economic contacts, wider interaction between NGOs and deeper economic integration can bring Australia into Taiwan's substantive, if not formal, security networks.