However, only two weeks after ensuring his grip on power by assuming the chairmanship of his ruling right-wing Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), Ma told "The Journalist" weekly that he may review "constitutional amendment" issues, including the continuation of the "dual executive" system of the president and premier, after the completion of his first two years in office next May and may put forward a package of proposed new amendments to the Republic of China Constitution.

This statement by the president and KMT chairman hints that he reverting to his party's instinctive practice of changing the political game rules when it might lose.

During his previous term as KMT chairman, Ma categorically refused to even discuss constitutional reform with Chen and the former Democratic Progressive Party on the grounds that, after 10 sets of revisions since 1991, Taiwan society needed to "recuperate" and that any constitutional restructuring would spark social antagonism.

Moreover, Ma severely criticized Chen's alleged "kidnapping of elections by referendum" in the presidential polls of March 2004 and March 2008, but reversed himself when he told The Journalist that he is willing to consider combining a referendum to ratify proposed constitutional amendments together with the presidential election in 2012.

The main target of the changes considered by Ma is the unwieldy "dual executive" system remaining from the piecemeal constitutional changes engineered by former president Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s.

In this system, the president is mainly responsible for national security, defense and external affairs, while the premier is supposed to be the highest executive official and is directly appointed by the president and, since 1997, no longer requires the approval of the Legislative Yuan.

Reconsideration of this system can only lead toward a presidential or a parliamentary system, but it is odd that Ma would consider changing this system which clearly favors the ruling party if, as now, the president and the legislative majority belong to the same party.

A likely reason is not difficult to discern, given the president's plunging approval ratings, namely a growing lack of confidence in his chances to win re-election in 2012.

On one hand, banking on its rich coffers and entrenched local organizations, the KMT leadership may consider that it is assured of winning a majority in any Legislative Yuan elections and thus will be able to "organize the Cabinet" and hold the premiership if the requirement for legislative approval is reinserted and effectively undermine a "minority president" from a different party, as the KMT did during the eight years of Chen's presidency.

On the other hand, the KMT leadership also desires the adoption of an absolute instead of a relative majority in direct presidential elections, partly due to the deeply-held belief that the relative majority system was the root cause of Chen's victory in March 2000 with a 39.3 percent plurality after the KMT camp was split by the maverick candidacy of James Soong after Lien Chan was assured of the KMT nomination.

Adoption of an absolute majority with a run-off system would, in the eyes of the KMT leadership, virtually ensure victories in future presidential polls based on its abundant finances and strong organization and prevent the repetition of a "minority presidency."

As in the past, Ma and the KMT leadership are responding to the real if still remote possibility of defeat in the 2012 presidential polls by moving back the goal posts and changing the institutional game rules to ensure its greatest advantages to keep the presidency and guarantee domination of the central government through control over the national legislature to prevent the return of a Taiwan-centric government.

However, this scheme has two weak points.

First, Ma will face unexpected tough bargaining to secure the necessary three - fourths Legislative support for such constitutional changes after the three - fourths majority won in January 2008 has been eroded by the annulment of the electoral victories of several KMT lawmakers for vote buying and the DPP has secured enough legislative seats to veto any constitutional changes proposed by the KMT.

Second, the KMT's political abacus assumes the continued validity of the conventional wisdom of "voter blocs" which posits that the KMT's pan-blue camp can confidently expect support among 50 percent of Taiwan's electorate while the DPP and the broad "pan-green" camp can only count on 40 percent.

It is worth noting that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party similarly confidently assumed eternal parliamentary dominance after implementing a "single-seat, first past the post" parliamentary election system, but was disabused of the notion of static voter blocks by the stunning victory of the Democratic Party of Japan in the wake of years of demonstrated incompetence by successive LDP prime ministers.

The morale is that tampering with the game rules cannot rescue an incompetent government.